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From ancient times up to the first industrial
revolution, economic development was
assumed to be purely cyclical: at the end of a
cycle, the situation was roughly the same as it
was at the starting point. The economic theory
implicit in the Bible is contained in the
description of the seven fat years followed by
the seven lean years. If any underlying growth
trend existed, it was of such a long-term nature
as to be imperceptible.
Economic concept
This was natural in agricultural economies
where relative wealth was very much a matter
of territorial conquest. However, the majority
of contemporary economists considering
growth since the beginning of the industrial
revolution have tended to assume that
economic cycles in the developed countries are
only a kind of variation (of a short or long-
term nature) in an underlying trend of
continuous growth.
This fundamental tendency has become more
pronounced during the 30 years since the
second world war to the extent that growth and
more particularly the growth rate have
assumed an importance unique in history.
It is also assumed that this economic growth,
based on material growth, is identical with the
growth of material economic welfare.
Growth factors
Economic growth of course is not a purely
economic phenomenon. It is the result of a
combination of factors: demographic,
financial, cultural, political, historical,
technological, geographical, medical, etc. This
very heterogeneous combinations is decisive, if
it happens in the right way, at the right place
and at the right time. The economic analysis of
Simon Kuznets gives a good idea of these key
factors, in particular capital and demography,
not forgetting the more general framework.
My purpose here is to try to answer such
questions as: what has really made growth, as
we have known it in the past decades, a unique
historical performance? Can we try to improve
the understanding of the mechanism in order
to control it better, or just to understand better
where we are going?
It is an obvious and generally accepted
hypothesis that technology has played a major
role in providing the technical bases for
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growth. But the origin of technology, its
characteristics and the mechanisms of its
diffusion throughout the economic structure,
are still not adequately analyzed for want of
clearly defined communication between
economists, technologists and natural
scientists. And if the technological machinery
is a fundamental factor which explains modern
economic growth, present discussions on the
limits of growth have to consider in a deeper
way the question whether technology has limits
or cycles, and if so, their type and nature. It is
unsatisfactory to 'believe' in technological
innovation, and it is interesting to examine
whether technology is also subject to the law of
diminishing returns.
Production function
Every student of economics, at the very
beginning of his course, becomes acquainted
with the production function and the law of
diminishing returns.
The production function is the equation
showing which are the principal economic
factors of production and how they are
combined. In the early stages of classical
economics, the factors taken into account were
land, capital and labour. Later on, the
function was reduced to capital and labour
only: theory had taken into-account the
diminishing importance of land for industrial
production and linked it with capital.
There has always been a clear and close
relationship between a specific historical
situation and the trends in economic theory.
For instance, between 1873 and 1896, in a
period of drastic deflation, when capital was
available .at a very low rate of interest, and
seemed almost to be free, some economists
started to develop a production function which
tended to exclude capital. Conversely, in
recent times, some other economists have
centered the production function on the
concept of capital.
The law of diminishing returns states simply
that given a fixed amount of one production
factor, additional units of the other
production factors bring diminishing yields
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until the point is reached at which the last,
marginal unit of the factor will yield nothing.
The classical case involves a fixed amount of
land where adding units of labour (and/or
capital) will increase the total yield but in a
decreasing amount for each additional unit,
until no increase at all becomes possible.
This theory is one of the very fundamental
laws from which many theoretical
developments derive: the law of competition in
a free-market system and its capacity to
optimize production in conjunction with the
free supply and demand mechanism, as well as
the marxist theory and the malthusian theories.
The law of diminishing returns is the
economists' edition of a much more general
law that one can find, differently expressed, in
many other natural and social sciences. Some
systems engineers will say that a system tends
to an equilibrium, via the mechanism of
negative feedback loops, which brings it to a
stand still, or stationary situation. Physicists
will speak of the law of entropy, as well as do
some economists." How much of this theory,
expressed at a high intellectual level, in
different scientific branches, is really scientific
and how much of it is of a cultural or
ideological nature, is probably still open to
discussion.
Nevertheless the fact remains that, coming
back to economics, past growth has to be
explained in spite - and within the framework
- of the law of diminishing returns.
It is here that technology intervenes as the
element, or as the coefficient, which - by the
introduction of an uninterrupted flow of new
applied inventions - steadily pushes back the
limits where one or the other of the production
factors becomes rigid and unextendable.
In this sense, for instance, it is asserted that the
Malthusian theory has been defeated by the
introduction of the potato. Adding up
available land and known agricultural
production on the one side, and the increasing
populations on the other, Malthus came to the
conclusion that these two trends were
incompatible and that the world was
condemned to starvation. At about the same
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time, the cultivation of the potato, coming
from the new world, was introduced, which
largely increased food production capacity.
Things then went even better, as we were really
in the first phase of the first industrial
revolution: the ancestor of the economic
growth of modern times.
First industrial revolution
The first industrial revolution is associated
with the spread of new technology: the flying-
shuttle loom and the steam engine are the main
symbols of the first successful battle against
the law of diminishing returns by the new
industrial era.
This technology was in no way associated with
science. It was the result of the improved
knowledge of the engineer, based on practical
experience and common sense. The steam
engine was developed when science did not yet
know what water was: the observation of how
water is converted into steam by heating and
the fact that the volume of the steam produced
is much larger than the volume of the water is
something anybody can easily make without
any need for a laboratory.
The same was true of the new looms: instead
of using a hand to push the shuttle, why not
just use a hammer, which struckthe shuttle
with the energy provided by the engine? The
ability to develop this kind of technology is
that of the engineer, or, more simply, of
somebody possessing practical ingenuity and
capable of making things work.
The basic technology of the first industrial
revolution was the last step of the technology
which man had been evolving since prehistoric
times. The engineers of the stone age were
those practical people who knew how to cut a
stone, the same type of people who in the iron
age, knew how to smelt certain special types of
earth to produce iron, without knowing
scientifically what iron was in terms of
chemistry and metallurgy.
This non-science-based-technology reached an
unprecedented level of development in the
course of the eighteenth century.
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It was the core of the industrial revolution,
which, by fits and starts spread from England
to the continent. It was only after 1850that
this economic growth movement started
developing more or less simultaneously in
different Western countries.
From 1850 to 1873, for example, rail mileage
grew in Germany from 3600 to 9500, in France
from 1800 to 11 500, in Belgium from 500 to
2300 and in the UK from 6600 to 16000. Coal
production followed the same trend in the four
countries. The same, except for France,
happened with raw cotton consumption.
In the course of these years, the first industrial
revolution came to maturity, growth
accelerated and spread rapidly.
Then in the following years and in particular
from 1873to 1896, prices fell to the extent of
representing the most important deflation in
the history of man.
In fact, deflation was a common phenomenon
for most of the 19th century. From 1817, right
after the Napoleonic wars, up to 1896,
deflation was dominant with the exception of
the period between 1850to 1857.
Economic theory, conditioning action, must
share some responsibility for this. The stress
was put on the supply side of the market:
accepted economic laws stated that by
definition all goods produced could be sold
automatically. To stimulate demand directly
was unacceptable. Many years had still to pass
until the pressure provided by the economic
crisis in 1929on the one hand, and Keynesian
theory on the other, led to action on the
demand side ofthe market.
This was all the more necessary because the
second industrial revolution was being
prepared, providing a larger and larger
reservoir of production capacity, as a result of
the breakthrough of a new type of technology:
science-based technology. Later on, the second
world war provided a tremendous stimulus to
bring this process to full maturity. The
frontiers of diminishing returns were pushed so
far back that they started to look academic.
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Second industrial revolution
At the end of last century, scientific advances
started to combine with technological
advances. To quote Professor Landesf
Behind this kaleidoscope of change - sometimes
marked by brilliant bursts, sometimes tedious in its
complex fragmentation, always bewildering in its
variety - one general trend is manifest: the ever-
closer marriage of science and technology.
We have already observed the essential
independence of these two activities during the
industrial revolution; and noted that such stimulus
and inspiration as did cross the gap went from
technology towards science rather than the other
way. Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth
century, however, a close alliance develops; and if
technology continued to pose fruitful problems for
scientific research the autonomous flow of scientific
discovery fed a widening stream of new techniques.
This marriage was not fully realized by those
personally involved. There are plenty of stories
of scientists who were unaware of the practical
applications of their discoveries, such as
Alexander Bell.
But the most important thing to note is that,
for instance, as a result of discovering what a
molecule is and learning how to build
macromolecules, it became possible to produce
new fibers. These transformations needed a
laboratory and a knowledge of the subject
which could not be acquired during normal
day-to-day experience without specific mental
and physical instruments, provided by the
development of science. Physics, biology,
chemistry, metallurgy and all the other sciences
opened man's eyes so that he could see what
bacteria were or detect invisible waves; in this
way he could control the first (with enormous
demographic consequences) and use the
second to transmit sounds, light, images and
heat.
New production function
Economics has grasped the new science-based
technological phenomenon for what it
apparently was in economic terms: a
coefficient which was deepening and enlarging
the production capacity of the major
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production factors, ie capital and labour.
There has been a great deal of argument as to
whether the impact of the technological
coefficient has been greater in the case of
labour than of capital.
In any case, evidence has been given of the
close correlation between investment in
research and development and economic
growth, for the most significant periods of this
development.
A statistical analysis conducted by Professor
Freeman of Sussex University for the period
between 1935 and 1958 in the United States
and the UK, concerning 17 industrial sectors,
provides clear evidence: the greater the
technological effort, the higher the growth.
For instance, in the United States, during the
period 1935-58, the aeronautical sector
invested in the research almost 40 per cent of
its total turnover and the industry grew by
more than 6000 per cent. The corresponding
figures for the electronics industry are: 25 per
cent of turnover invested for a growth of 1000
per cent; for the chemical industry: 8 per cent
of turnover for a growth of about 400 per cent;
for the textile industry: 0.2 per cent of
turnover for a growth of 60 per cent.
It is worth noting that technology, during the
first industrial revolution, cost nothing. It was
natural, therefore, to treat it as a coefficient.
It now seems that it would be more
appropriate to build the production function,
as some economists have suggested, including
technology - or Rand D investment - as a
production factor in its own right. The main
reason for this is that Rand D is something
very different from the utilization of labour
and capital for a given output on a time basis.
The cost of the Rand D used and incorporated
in a given output has been borne over a
considerable amount of years before even the
plants forthe new products could be designed.
Rand D operates in a totally dynamic reality
with very long and varying lead times, coupled
with a considerable uncertainty as to the results
of each specific research project. One needs to




Certainly the technological performance, in
this century, has been bewildering. But the
widely diffused images of 'future shocks'
implying continuous and accelerated change
due to scientific innovations, are often
misleading.
The big confusion starts at the point where the
acceleration of the number of new products
and services put on the market is taken as
proof that technology can change things
quicker and quicker. In the majority of cases,
this is utterly false and it reflects the fact that,
as Tolstoi said, changes are perceived when
they have already taken place and not when
they are under way.
The more a new technology is science-based,
the more time is necessary to develop it.
Physicists confirm that today any new
fundamental discovery in physics will take at
least 20 years to be applied. And even when a
new technology has been developed in a
laboratory to the level of a prototype, the
industrialization of that process can take many
years before it really appears in public.
Let us take as an example the new generation
of textile looms (so-called shuttleless looms) ..
In the case of one of the major and most
successful types of this new technological
generation, the first ideas and designs were
developed over ten years, from 1930 to 1940,
the first prototypes being developed from 1946
to 1960. The first sales started in 1960 and it
then took 15 years for these machines to
achieve 10 per cent of the total world market.
What some traditional textile industries might
still consider a 'new technology' , was already
designed 40 years ago.
The public in reality has been struck by
changes which are 'sudden' because of psycho-
sociological and social mechanisms: on the
contrary, at the technical level, new changes
are much more difficult and time-consuming
today than they were in the last century.
What is often presented as an acceleration is
often simply a reduction in the time needed for
an industrialist to grasp the business
opportunity offered by an available
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technology. In this way, photography took 112
years to be applied and transistors five. One
must also take into account the existence of
contradictory criteria used in order to
determine which is the real discovery moment
and which the moment of appication.
In any case, the 'accelerating pace of
technology' is more a social problem than a
technological reality.
On the contrary, the difficulty of setting up an
Rand D policy and of estimating the economic
relevance of the research is increased by
lengthening lead times. The complexity and
multidisciplinarity of research introduce a
further element of delay.
Let us not forget that the first landing on the
moon was done on the basis of technology
available ten years before, at the moment when
the American space programme was prepared
and approved.
Limits of science
The idea that technology has unlimited
beneficial effects and potentials has been often
directly or implicitly admitted, particularly
during the 1960s.
We can now list a series of considerations
which show how technology is itself subject to
the law of diminishing returns and in some
cases even negative returns.
Lead times
The first limitation come from the fact that
technological lead times do not fit easily into
the supply-demand equilibrium. Economic
theory says that when a product is in short
supply, its price will increase in such a way as
to discourage demand and/or stimulate the
supply of a competitive substitute. It would
appear, then, that this mechanism stimulates
new technologies because it stimulates
substitution.
But this equilibrium is conceived as essentially
static: in practical situations it means that it is
short term. Most economic theory is based on
static assumptions, where there is no room for
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dynamic factors. This was reasonable in more
static situations than those prevailing after the
second industrial revolution.
Where substitution is subject to long delays,
the supply-demand mechanism can even work
the opposite way. Let us take the recent case of
the energy crisis: the market price of oil reacted
at first as if supply were inelastic. In reality,
this inelasticity because of technology, is a
factor of time: in fact we have an-elastic supply
situation, with a prolonged response delay.
But because the market reacts in the short
term, technological adaptability looks more
and more as economic rigidity.
One could say that science-based technology
introduces therefore, because of the delay bias,
an element of economic vulnerability, in the
sense that market supply/demand mechanism
can fall- in the absence of external
intervention and under given circumstances -
into a self unfulfilling logic. The key problem
is therefore to include in the supply/demand
equilibrium these dynamic, delayed factors.
This difficulty is aggravated in cases where
concentration and markets have gigantic
dimensions, as with fertilizers. We have here a
world market of over 100 million tons: a
variation in supply or demand of less than I
per cent (which can be due just to delays in
shipping or to a couple of weeks of exceptional
rain in an important agricultural zone) involves
already a considerable volume of product, and
as such can completely disrupt the price
equilibrium, which can easily double or halve
for very marginal quantities. Here again,
disrupted prices for marginal quantities can
disrupt investment (justified on longer-term
considerations) far more than is warranted by
the quantities involved on the price upheaval.
Let us now look at the cycles of technological
innovation itself.
Invention cycles
Technological change gives evidence of a series
of superposed medium-term, long-term and
very long-term cycles. Let us take the case of
man-made fibers.
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In the course of this century, we have
experienced roughly two large invention cycles
linked to two fundamental ideas. First, the
birth, growth and development of the so-called
artificial fibers, was based on the following
idea: a natural fiber such as cotton is
constituted of some sort of cellulosic material.
Why not transform other sources of cellulosic
material, with appropriate chemical
treatments, in order to obtain other textile
fibers?
This basic idea opened up opportunities of
finding various solutions. Three of four of the
best of those solutions succeeded each other,
and were the key element in the development
of this industry. At the end of the whole cycle,
everything suggested that further development
could not be achieved through a new type of
artificial fiber. The new development had to be
sought in a new basic principle, answering the
following new question: why use cellulosic
material and why not just use whatever other
chemical structure we can build provided it can
be based on macro-molecules and have
appropriate properties?
We can observe here that we have to use more
sophisticated scientific knowledge, and that
the raw material is no longer similar to a
natural fiber (cellulose being related to
cotton), but is a very different source (oil)
which has to be chemically rebuilt and
transformed. And so, the synthetic fibers came
into being.
Here again we can observe subsequent cycles
of four major families (although the trade
names give the impression that there are
thousands), each of them giving a formidable
propulsion to industrial development.
This second major cycle came to maturity in
the last decade: new families of fibers have
been invented but their application is more and
more marginal, and compared with the past
successes of the big four, rather insignificant.
The bulk of research has been more and more
concentrated for the last ten years on the
improvement of existing fibers.




The question would seem to be: how can a new
fundamental cycle be initiated? One answer
has been research into non-wovens, but it has
clearly failed. And it seems difficult to use the
deepening knowledge of physics and chemistry
to produce a revolutionary new approach, at
least for the next decade. Of course one can
argue optimistically and say: you can never
predict fundamental changes, although this
does not modify the time-lag problem. Or one
can argue more pessimistically: we are more
and more coming to the point where science-
based technology, at least in certain sectors,
has exploited all the major possibilities made
available by the scientific advances of the last
century.
Analogies with the fiber development cycles
are easy to identify in other industrial sectors,
such as aviation for instance, and many
chemical products.
At this stage, some good opportunities appear
still to exist in the electronics communication
field and, of course, but with a rather longer
time lag, in the energy field.
Very extensive research into the present
situation regarding time lags and cycles over
the whole spectrum of technologies in all
sectors is necessary. Our point here is that
technological production is not immune from
its own law of diminishing returns; which is
implicit in the whole history of discovery and
invention.
But there are other ways in which technology,
by its very development, can have the effect of
diminishing economic returns.
Micro-behaviour
At the micro-economic level, the phenomenon
of the diminishing returns of technology has
been experienced in some industries for more
than a decade already, at the level of the
company body responsible for Rand D
investment.
Figure 1 gives an idea of the problem:
• at time to' a new research programme is
started: money is invested with no possibility










• at t1' the new research programme has
started to yield a new product which is put
on the market, but research continues to
improve it and expand its applications, so
that for a period of time, income is less than
outlays on continuing research and product
penetration costs;
• only at t2does income match outlays; this
marks the start of the period during which
one must recover the deficit accumulated
from to to t2;
• this deficit is offset at point t3;
• the whole operation starts yielding net profit
only after t3;
• at t4 another product is put in the market,
which makes the first one obsolete, and
therefore its marketable period is over.
This outline, of course, is simplified, but it
helps to bring out the impact of trends which
in many cases make the whole situation very
vulnerable:
• at toof a research programme, it must be
borne in mind that as a rule, only less than
10 per cent of projects will be successful. If
investing some $100 million per year in R
and D, a company knows that $90 million
will be simply wasted. The successful part of
the programme must therefore cover this net
loss. In some industries, the situation is
aggravated by the fact that the percentage
of successes is diminishing, so that to make
the probability law of large numbers
operate, research - and therefore
investment in it - must expand. (ie to
deepen point tl);
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• increased research costs mean that the
period for recovering them must be longer
or that the market must be larger: the whole
programme becomes more and more risky;
• on the other hand, increased research means
adding obsolescence to the products: substi-
tution will be quicker and quicker. This does
not happen because - as we have seen -
results can be achieved quickly, but because
parallel research in the whole industry will,
as a consequence, lead to comparable
solutions which will curtail the available
time for exploiting the benefits of a research
project. The drive for substitution, which in
all sectors has increased the trends towards
shorter obsolescence time - or put more
simply - which has resulted in products
with a shorter and shorter life ('use and
throwaway' products, from the
handkerchief to the watch) has become in
many sectors a nonsense even in purely
economic terms, as for instance the story of
textile disposables (non-woven products) has
shown. These trends have not yet completely
generalized within industry as a whole, but
they exist in those sectors of industry which
have achieved maturity, and where a
qualitative technological leap is out of the
question for the next decade at least.
Specialization push
Technology, in many cases, means to produce
something better, faster and in larger
quantities. There is a tremendous push
towards specialization. In fact, a machine very
often produces more, quicker and better than a
more limited type of products than the
machine which it has replaced. These
improvements are often at the expense of
range and flexibility. A dear example is
provided by the modern shuttle-less looms
which have superseded the traditional loom.
Each of the new methods offers an advantage
in a more restricted application. Limits are
reached when for instance a single machine is
capable of producing 500 ()()() blankets per year
very efficiently, provided-they are all of the
same type, from all the points of view:
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materials, colour, size, textile structure, etc. In
cases such as this, specialization becomes an
economic attraction from the point of view of
production, but an economic nonsense from
the point of view of distribution and utilization
of the products.
Distribution networks
The more decisive limits are of another nature.
The success of technology seems to lead,
paradoxically in many cases, to a situation in
which production becomes marginal to the
economic process. Producing more specialized
products faster, in larger quantities, has the
effect of increasing the amount and selectivity
of materials used in the manufacturing
process, increasing storage problems once the
product is manufactured, increasing
distribution networks and increasing all the
financial problems that go with it. It is more
and more frequent for manufactured goods to
have a final production cost at the plant
ranging from 10 to 20 per cent of what they
cost to the ultimate consumer.
In more and more cases, production has
become an appendix of the distribution system
for a great many products of our everyday life.
It is not that profits are gigantic, but simply
that technology, by concentrating production,
has increased the amount and cost of the
operations which intervene before and after
this phase. Although economists still speak of
the tertiary sector (services)as separate from the
secondary sector (industrial production), the
most important development in the advanced
industrial economies is not the growth of the
sector nominally classified as tertiary. Far
more significant is the tertiarization of the
secondary and primary (agricultural) sectors.
All this means that a lot of mistakes can be
made when one does a cost/benefit analysis of
a new product, at the manufacturing level.
Apparent gains at that level can be more than
offset by the increased costs involved in the
whole system of distribution. Considerations
of this kind some years ago, for instance,
prevented the chemical industry from stepping
up the individual capacity of ammonia or
ethylene production units.
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Environmental balance
Technology encounters some limits also in
terms of the environmental equilibrium.
Economists developed in the past the concept
of external costs: when one is building a
railroad, the land withdrawn from agriculture
represents a cost in terms for instance of lost
agricultural production. But, with traditional
technology, the problem of external costs
remained, in the main, limited.
With science-based technology,it is another
matter, because science-based technological
production changes the structure of materials
and modifies the natural recycling patterns.
The problem of course is aggravated, in a
cumulative way, by the total increase in
production.
The production process itself can be seen as a
waste-producing process: raw materials are
extracted and part of them is thrown away,
right at the place of extraction; they are
refined, and another part is thrown away
there; they are then treated or transformed and
more waste is produced; the final products
induce more waste at the distribution level;
finally, the end product is consumed or used
until it is thrown away. Technology, in many
cases increases the life span of natural
recycling: often the more a product has been
transformed because of scientific knowledge,
the longer the recycling period and the
recycling costs. The treatment of uranium
wastes takes this phenomenon to its most
costly and dangerous limits.
Added value
All these phenomena should be better
evaluated at the macroeconomic level. In fact,
national accounting is based on the idea that
every economic activity which is paid for is an
added value. But, too often, added value is
equated with economic growth or is treated as
an index of economic welfare (the growth of
GNP).
It would rather seem that one of the main
features of advanced industrial economies is
that economic activity is not equivalent to
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economic welfare. Many, and more and more
of the values added, are in fact values which
are deducted from economic welfare, because
of the wealth subtracting by-products of the
advanced technological-economic system
itself.
This phenomenon goes beyond the simple
phenomenon of the external costs (where the
problem is simply to 'internalize' them).
Investing in the anti-pollution industry does
not increase economic welfare by increasing
the nominal national income, so that the
national community does not appear to have
more wealth to dispose of. Similarly, buying
an electrical machine, at home, to destroy part
of the amount of waste a family produces in
one day, is not an increase in welfare; it is just
catching up with an induced cost, a deducted
value, which has produced this type of need by
the very kind of development characteristics of
advanced economies.
In other words, in discussing welfare and net
economic added value to wealth, one should
start by discriminating between real values and
those which, curiously, are called added, but
represented in fact deducted values. This
would bring about more realistic assessments
of real available national wealth upon which to
build, for instance, a social policy.
The question of deducted values also brings up
the problem of distinguishing between one
level, the standard of living, and another level
- the one which is represented by the
accumulated deducted value - which
represents a level of survival in the sense that it
results in economic activities, consuming
energy which is used for the preservation of
production systems itself rather than being
used directly for the purpose for which the
whole economic system exists: to produce real
wealth for people.
All these points are not intended to prove that
science and technology are condemned once
and for all to the law of diminishing returns.
They merely emphasise some experiences of
this last decade, which would need to be
verified by a thorough analysis of all industrial
and technological sectors.
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Many sectorial improvements are possible,
some through the synergism of one sector
influencing the progress of the other, as for
instance the case of synthetic fibers offering a
major opportunity for technological
innovation in the knitting machinery industry.
But, we have also seen that the unique
economic growth of this century has a very
specificorigin in the historical, unique marriage
between science and technology, on the one
hand. On the other, there are obvious
limitations, which are all the more serious
because of the time mechanism involved, in the
science-technology- production sequence.
It is also possible that the future battle against
the law of diminishing returns will find another
coefficient, or another way to combine or
interpret the production function. For the time
being, the advanced industrial countries are
living in a period of increased vulnerability.
Understanding these vulnerabilities, and
finding a way to control and reduce them is
becoming of greater and greater importance.
The limits of growth, which have been made
popular by the Club of Rome, and exploited
politically after Yom Kippur warof 1973, are
fundamentally due to limits internal to the
production mechanisms, rather than simply
external limits.
Vulnerability control
We mean by vulnerability the situation of a
system (be it an industry, a group of a national
economy) in which survival is imperiled by
some specific events, acts, or failures to act.
When such events, acts or failures occur, the
system is destroyed or at least fundamentally
modified.
Many of the limits we have described in
previous paragraphs are indices of
vulnerability. We can regard vulnerability as
depending on two types of risks: the positive
and the negative (or pure) ones. The first are
due to human initiative (the entrepreneurial
risks implicit in a voluntary action), the second
depend on unforeseeable events (an accident,
an earthquake).These two risks are in most
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cases linked: a company starts selling a new
product and takes the risk of finding a
responsive market, but the production plants
of the same company can burn down and
therefore make it impossible for the company
to play its entrepreneurial role. The same
applies to individuals: the great majority of
people have to work in order to live and if
possible prosper, but a personal accident can
make this goal impossible to achieve.
We can note that the situation of mature
growth described in the previous chapters is
characterized by the increasing vulnerability of
the economic system, which can be expressed
by the following two phenomena:
• both types of risks are of growing
dimensions due on the one hand to direct
technological effects (concentration of
production, deepening of scientific
technology) and on the other hand to the
growth of interdependence which increases
the number of factors involved in the
functioning of a system and which can be
exposed to a breakdown; and
• both types of risks are more and more
interrelated: the higher the vulnerability
levels, the greater the need for coordinated
management of the two aspects of risk.
Let us consider first the entrepreneurial risk
aspects of vulnerability management. Starting
from what is described in the previous
paragraphs, this is the case for instance with an
Rand D policy - at the level of industrial
companies as well as of national economies -
based on a detailed knowledge of the prospects
of further progress, considering on the one
hand the lead times and on the other the
economic contraints. It is probable that in
many cases, technological progress would have
to be directed towards greater efficiency,
aiming at decreasing economic and social
vulnerability, developing other production and
distribution criteria than those which lead to
so-called economies of scale and higher speeds
or larger capacities.
It is necessary in this case to estimate what are
the real added values, internalizing all external
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costs and separating the deducted values: this
is what fundamentally is meant or aimed at in
the case of what is called technology
assessment, environmental policy, qualitative
growth, long-term energy policy, etc. All
these are isolated concepts, isolated policies,
producing isolated and conflicting results: they
are all parts of what could be a clearer,
integrated economic vulnerability management
policy.
In a comprehensive vulnerability concept and
policy not only are the so-called
entrepreneurial risks taken into consideration,
but also the 'pure' ones and their interrelation
with one another. Vulnerability in advanced
economies today is not the consequence of an
accident - fire or earthquake - happening in
a given place, as given the degree of urban
concentration, the concentration of
production, the interdependence of the
economic system (which are all major effects
of the second industrial revolution), tend to
reach more and more catastrophic levels,
increasing the system's vulnerability.
Health, pollution, transport, energy
production, social security are some of the
major sectors in which more and more
vulnerability problems arise: all types of risks
are here closely interrelated, and they represent
cost elements (very often of the deducted
values type) which deserve closer attention.
Another problem confronts economists facing
the assessment of vulnerabilities, in particular
with regard to 'pure' risks, some of which are
typical of the commitments of the insurance
industry. They do not generally fit into the
production function, just like the
technological factor. In fact, they are also
dynamic, as technology is, in the sense that the
damages related to production are a
probabilistic pattern projected into the future,
instead of being projected into the past, as
technology is. The sequence is something like
this:
• first, there is a period of research;
• then a product, based on this research,
appears on the market and is submitted as
such to the price mechanism;
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• this product, or this process of production,
might be the cause of damages to the
environment, to people, to property, in part
at least due to unknown effects and in part
due to pure accidents. If an insurance system
is organized, a premium is collected (which is
a production cost) for damages whicIt...will
happen in the future in unknown conditions
or time. As in the case of research, we have
an element of unredictability, for something
happening after, and not before, the
product is at the production or marketing
stage.
Here again, we find a dynamic situation, which
does not fit into the static framework of the
demand and supply curves: it has been easier
for economics virtually to ignore this
important part of the indirect future costs of
economic activity. Insurance, for instance, is
often treated as a simple transfer service, with
no added-value (or rather deducted value). In
this case, economics has deprived itself of the
possibility of using a tool to evaluate the actual
costs of production implicit in the vulnerabiity
of the production process itself.
Let us give an example of what this means in
practice. Let us assume that I per cent of a
given production is statisticaIly bound to be
destroyed by accident (a store, a machine, a
weaving loom). After the accident, the damage
will be replaced and will constitute part of the
total added-value: in other words, 101 looms
will be produced in order to have 100 exempt
from damage or destruction. Everything is
computed as added value, without
acknowledgement of the part of it which
represents an additional cost in keeping the
rest running.
In a static situation, in an economy of limited
vulnerability, this might be satisfactory in
practice. But in an advanced industrial
economy, the problem is that the cost of 'pure'
risks increases proportionately faster than the
average economic growth trend (which is
another facet of the problems described in the
previous paragraphs): this growth happens in a
dynamic context of lengthening time limits, as
in the case, for instance, of the long-term
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negative effects of drugs on health and on the
environment.
It would seem useful therefore to single out
this economic cost element, in order to better
measure it, understand its impact, and finally
develop a significant branch of risk economics
within the framework of general economics,
and in the specific context of the present phase
of economic development of the advanced
industrial countries.
Inflation returns
Another important element of economic
vulnerability is the persistent difficulty in
dealing with inflation: among other factors, we
believe that the understanding of the process
of diminishing returns of technology can bring
some light, by focusing attention on the
increasing rigidities of the supply side of the
economic equilibrium.
Achieving an equilibrium between the demand
for and supply of goods and services is what
economics is all about. When this equilibrium
is not achieved, inflation (or deflation) - as
Keynes said - is nature's remedy.
Looking back again at the economic history of
Europe in the last two centuries since the
advent of the industrial revolution, we can
recall that 'nature's remedy' had to work most
of the time. We have already noticed that
during the last century - if we exclude periods
of war _ it was mainly deflation which
characterized the economic scene.
Classical economists and most entrepreneurs
had failed to fully understand the impact of
new technology, which was adding to the
factors of production a great capacity for
reducing or even reversing the law of
diminishing returns. Economists of the period
believed that everything actually produced
would be automatically consumed: there was
thus no need to encourage either supply or
demand. We can take as examples Ricardo'S
theory by which all savings were automatically
invested and Say's law according to which
production would have always be met by an
equal demand.
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The effect of these theoretical beliefs was that
many discoveries and inventions (as for
instance photography) had to wait for a long
time before becoming a marketable product,
and as such produce value added, for reasons
which often were not primarily technological.
On the demand side, only nature acted from
time to time in a Keynesian fashion: twice in
the course of the century an important arrival
of gold boosted demand and reversed the
deflationary trend. The result was better
exploitation of the production potential
augmented by available technology and the
start of a new economic cycle and upward
growth path. Even a little inflation occured,
but was then absorbed in a few years.
The effect of technology during the last two
centuries ofthe industrial revolution
(traditional technology plus science-based
technology from the beginning on this
century), has been to continually increase the
potentiality of the supply of output. It was the
existence of this potentiality in the economy,
not clearly understood, which allowed
Keynesian theories and methods of managing
the economy by stimulating demand, to work.
This also explains why, during the 1930s, it
was essential to convince the public to augment
their consumption. The application of a short-
run economic theory, like the Keynesian
theory, was sufficient to keep the production
machine running. Thanks to technology, the
economy had accumulated enormous potential
or hidden capacities, and under these
conditions, it was right, for Keynes to stress
that economic equlibrium could be achieved
with full employment and that this was one of
the possible equilibrium states.
Jumping from the mid-1930s to the present, we
again find the industrialized world in a period
of great economic uncertainty. Let us look
closer at how we arrived at the present
situation. In 1945, no economist or politician
would have believed a forecast predicting the
average level of economic growth actually
achieved by the industrialized countries to
1973. The forecast of such reality would have
been labeled as extravagant.
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As we previously stated, for economists,
technology was a factor outside their
production functions and their models; they
did not feel that it was their job to include it in
their analysis is an 'endogenous' factor.
Scientists were, in the main, too keen on
maintaining their aurea and had problems in
admitting that engineers could exploit their
findings. Engineers were too busy in designing
and building new production units and new
production processes in the chemical,
mechanical, electrical, electronic and transport
sectors, to bother about what they considered
the general verbalization of economists or the
abstract thinking of the scientists.
Politicians, after the second world war, had at
least learned something from the mistakes
made after the first world war and helped to
remove all sorts of barriers. Finally, we should
not forget that war technology had given the
last push to new science-based technological
products. So, it could be said that the long
period of growth occurred in spite of, or
maybe because of, generalized
nonunderstanding. And this represented a
period during which technology became more
and more an essential factor of production)
Key questions
Up to the late 1960sthe system worked:
Keynesianism, although a short-run and
demand-based theory, found greater and
greater acceptance and benefitted
paradoxically from a long-term economic-
technological cycle which increased output
potential. In the economic circles, the only
alternative school of thought to gain wide
acceptance has been the monetarists, who
insist on closer management of the monetary
mass, and who therefore tend to be more
cautious than the Keynesians in controlling
demand. But both, in the end, concentrate on
demand and on short-run problems, whereas
the key questions which should be asked are
the following ones: What is happening to the
equilibrium between supply and demand on
the supply side? Is technology still providing
the same type of new potential productoin as it
did 10or 20 years ago?
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In reading the economic press, both on the
theoretical and the journalistic level, one has
the feeling that technology is something
inscrutable but definitely without limits.
Belief in technology, following upon 25 years
of experience during which almost every
economist has come to think 'don't bother
about it, it works', has often substituted for
closer analysis. Doubts about it are equated to
doubts against human creativity and ingenuity.
In some articles in the American, British or
French press one can even find astonishing
remarks such as: 'The recent crisis was so deep,
that the recovery to the normal rate of growth
will be the next major problem' ,4 or 'managers
in industry take less initiatives with new
products: they have less entrepreneurial
attitudes than 20 years ago'.5
The assumption of the economic journalist in
the last remark is that technology is exploitable
now just as it was 20 years ago, and present
shortcomings are thus attributable to the
industrial manager. We may wonder how far
unverified assumptions can become a matter of
faith. What are the reactions of an industrial
manager, say in the chemical industry, to such
criticisms after having experienced 20 or 30
years ago the booms of the new synthetic fibers
and knowing that in the next few years there
will probably not be a new product capable of
producing a similar expansionary effect on the
fiber market as did the introduction of nylon,
acrylics, or polyesters!
All this is reflected in a recent analysis" of
investment trends after cyclical downturns in
the US economy since 1950 that has shown
that after each recovery, industrial investment
grew at a lower rate than in the previous cycle.
In the present state of economic recovery,
uncertainty on this point is greater than ever.
All this coincides also with the opinion of some
economists, that we are experiencing at present
a cyclical long-run period of reduced returns
on capital.
If all these trends have their common origin in
the phenomenon of diminishing returns of
technology, there is no reason for bitter
pessimism but rather grounds for fighting
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against the fatalistic pessimism growing in
Europe. If, on the one side, we admit the case
for a reduced possibility of long-term,
sustained economic growth, a better
understanding of the reasons for this will allow
us to take better actions and perhaps - why
not - to prepare the ground for a new golden
era, even if this one may be as distant as the
end of the century.
A more dangerous deep-rooted pessimism is
that generated by economists proposing actions
to return to 'traditional growth' without really
justifying the envisaged mechanism. These
economists have already had to face the fact
that pushing for 'traditional growth' has
resulted in too many stop and go economic
policies which have only served to aggravate
the confidence of those managing the
economy.
Inertia growth
They are now trying to save the 'good old
myth' by saying that the economy disposes of
more and more unemployed capacities and
that the key to all solutions is to fight against
bottlenecks. They have not recognized the fact
that average figures on under-utilization of
capacities say very little: the chain of
production has expanded so much and
multiplied the steps from the raw material to
the final product, that inertia is becoming
greater and greater.
On the other side, the so-called bottlenecks
cannot be easily overcome: they often reflect
the existence of an economic rigidity directly
linked with the phenomena of the diminishing
returns of technology. A bottleneck is easy to
find at the level of imports of raw material
sources of energy, where no technology up
to now has provided adequate substitutes.
Many bottlenecks are detectable at the
intermediate production and distribution
levels, for very understandable and objective
economic reasons and not just for the lack of
good adaptive management. The adaptation of
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interdependent production capacities is less
and less a linear problem, solvable by
increasing demand in the short term. We must
again insist on the fact that the understanding
of why things happen is the key to reasonable
optimism and appropriate action.
Coming back to our considerations of
inflation, we would then define the present
state of affairs as nature's remedy for the
squeeze between demand pressures and supply
limitations.
Although this is largely due to diminishing
returns of technology, we must also remember
that this analysis only takes into consideration
the economic factors involved, even though
these are always substantiallymodified by
other social, historical and local factors within
a given objective framework.
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